July 30, 2008

Long Island Doctor Accused of Spying With Hidden Camera

A Long Island doctor is in trouble after police accused him of installing a hidden camera in the bathroom of his medical office, according to this news article. Nassau County police say Vincent Pacienza of North Hills was arrested and charged with unlawful surveillance.

According to the report, the doctor’s staff discovered the camera, which had been concealed inside an air purifier shipped from a spy store. Staff members apparently notified authorities about the hidden camera. The 54-year-old doctor was arraigned and released after posting $2,500 cash bail.

There is not much information about why the camera may have been installed. Based on information provided in this article, there is no information about why the camera was believed to be the doctor’s either. The fact that it was found in the restroom of his office may not necessarily mean that he put it there.

These are patterns of inquiry we follow as criminal defense attorneys. Many defendants face public scrutiny and embarrassment because of false charges by disgruntled employees, jealous neighbors or other enemies. People give false statements out of spite. If you or a loved one has been charged with a crime in the state of New Jersey, call the New Jersey criminal defense attorneys of Lependorf & Silverstein to discuss your case. Whether your case is a misdemeanor, a felony or involves a violent crime, we will work hard to make sure you have the best possible outcome.

July 23, 2008

Bridgeton Man Pleads Guilty To Forgery

A 55-year-old Bridgeton man has plead guilty to forgery, after he falsified U.S. bonds worth more than $41,000. According a news report in South Jersey News Online, Rory McCafferty admitted that from May 2005 to March 2006 he forded another man’s signature, used false identification and cashed about 253 bonds at different banks in Bucks County in Pennsylvania.

He also admitted that in that time, he disposed of the remaining 156 bonds, each with a value of $36,869 because he was afraid of getting caught. McCafferty faces up to 10 years and a fine of $250,000.

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July 16, 2008

New Jersey Supreme Court Makes "Bad Law" in Child Abuse Case, Denigrating Our Constitutional Right to Confront Our Accusers (Part 3)

Part 3 of a 3-part series about the Right to Confrontation.
By Peter B. Paris

“Testimonial” or “Non-Testimonial”: That is the Constitutional Question

In Crawford, the Court’s key point was that, if the out-of-court statement was “testimonial,” it cannot be admitted in evidence without an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the statement. But, the U.S. Supreme Court left the definition of “testimonial” for another day. That day came two years later in Davis and Hammon, in which the Court presented two competing examples of potentially admissible hearsay: one that was “testimonial” and another that was not.

On the one hand, Davis held that if a person is in immediate danger and calls 911 for help, the statements to the 911 operator are not “testimonial” because the person making the statement is simply seeking help, not expecting that their words will be used later in court. These words are also properly admitted under the “excited utterance” exception to the hearsay rule, if the danger exists while the person is on the phone with 911. Thus, statements that resemble the frantic 911 call in Davis are more likely to be admissible without needing the declarant to testify.

By contrast, Hammon involved statements given to an investigating police officer during a police investigation. Such statements were deemed to be clearly “testimonial” because most people realize that when they submit to an interview with a police officer, their statements are likely to be used later in court. Thus, under Hammon, if an out-of-court statement is made under circumstances that more resemble a police interview than a frantic 911 call, then the statement is “testimonial” and, accordingly, cannot be admitted without cross-examining the declarant.

N.M.’s statement to the social worker about the alleged abuse was made during the social worker’s interview, which is obviously more like a police interview than a frantic 911 call. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court surprisingly declared that N.M.’s statements to the social worker – made in response to leading questions by the social worker – were actually more like the spontaneous calls for help during the 911 call in Davis than the police interview in Hammon. This fiction allowed the Court to find the child-accuser’s statement to be “non-testimonial” and, thus, admissible.

This tenuous distinction allowed the conviction to stand. But, Justice Albin’s vigorous dissent exposes the transparently illogical reasoning that was apparently motivated by the Court’s desire to uphold the conviction of a child-abuser at the risk of eroding our Constitutional Right to Confrontation.

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July 15, 2008

New Jersey Supreme Court Makes "Bad Law" in Child Abuse Case, Denigrating Our Constitutional Right to Confront Our Accusers (Part 2)

Part 2 of a 3-part series about the Right to Confrontation.
By Peter B. Paris

The Historical Use of Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule to Erode the Right to Confrontation

In 1980, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ohio v. Roberts, the Right to Confrontation began its twenty-four year decline. In Roberts, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the use of out-of-court statements in trials by giving trial judges the discretion to admit out-of-court statements without a live witness, so long as the judge felt the overall circumstances indicated that the statement was reliable. Essentially, Roberts allowed the introduction of evidence on a case by case, judge by judge basis.

Despite the unreliability of children as witnesses, or perhaps because of it, child abuse prosecutions routinely went forward even though the child-accusers never testified. If the facts were “bad” enough, judges were able to use Roberts to protect child-accusers from cross-examination by allowing adults to testify for them. To cover their Constitutional tracks, judges cited Roberts and simultaneously stretched the boundaries of various established rules of evidence, such as the “excited utterance” exception.

In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the problem it had created: the steady erosion of the Right to Confrontation, which in turn, caused an erosion of the Right to Fair Trial. The Justices reacted to this concern by issuing Crawford v. Washington, which was unanimously viewed as a watershed moment in Constitutional law, because it “changed” the Constitution from what people thought it had been for the past twenty-four years since Roberts. Crawford made some bold pronouncements but left a host of unanswered questions, some of which were later addressed in 2006 when the Court issued Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.

By writing the Crawford opinion, the Court simultaneously resurrected the role of the Rules of Evidence in protecting our Right to Confrontation. The Court held that Roberts was wrong to permit the rampant use of hearsay evidence to convict people of crimes. In sum, the Court said that it was a violation of the Constitutional Right to Confrontation to admit “testimonial” hearsay evidence against an accused person, unless the maker of the statement has been subjected to cross-examination.

State and federal courts are now grappling with the implications of Crawford, in particular the definition of a “testimonial” statement. In Davis and Hammon, the Court provided much needed insight into the definition of the word “testimonial” by providing concrete examples. But, as the New Jersey Supreme Court recently proved in State v. Buda, more guidance is needed if the erosion of our Right to Confrontation is to be stopped.

State v. Buda: The New Jersey Supreme Court Continues to Use Hearsay Exceptions to Dilute Our Constitutional Right to Confrontation

On June 23, 2008, a majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court issued State v. Buda over a vigorous dissent, led by Justice Albin. The majority opinion’s logic was so flawed, and its legal reasoning so shallow, that it is obvious the majority lost sight of its duty of judicial neutrality in favor of making sure the conviction stood. In doing so, the Court again used the Rules of Evidence to degrade our right to confront and cross-examine our accusers.

In Buda, a young child accused a family member of abuse outside of court, but then never testified at the trial. Instead, an adult witness was permitted to testify about what the child had said. Defendant Buda was unable to cross-examine the child and was convicted in large part because of the child’s hearsay statement. The New Jersey Supreme Court used this and two other cases to illustrate the meaning of “testimonial” statements by studying Crawford, Davis and Hammon and issuing its own interpretation of those cases.

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July 14, 2008

New Jersey Supreme Court Makes "Bad Law" in Child Abuse Case, Denigrating Our Constitutional Right to Confront Our Accusers (Part 1)

Part 1 of a 3-part series about the Right to Confrontation.
By Peter B. Paris

There is an old adage in the legal world that warns us, “BEWARE: Bad facts make bad law.” In other words, sometimes when “bad facts” occur, like a horrible crime or tragic event, policy-makers react with short-term legal “fixes” which end up having negative, unintended consequences down the road. It’s a little different from “throwing the baby out with the bath water,” but the effect is the same.

Typically, it is lawmakers who overreact to “bad facts.” After all, they are the ones fielding the angry phone calls and emails from constituents, demanding some concrete action that will “make sure [fill in the blank] never happens again.” To silence the phones and to refill the campaign coffers, legislators respond to the “bad facts” by drafting a new draconian law designed to prevent the “bad facts” from recurring. One prominent example of this is the crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparity that originally had some short term impact on the problem of crack distribution, but it did not stop the problem and mostly caused long term harm. Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission and the U.S. Supreme Court have criticized that “bad law.”

Enforcers of the law are also susceptible to making “bad law” in reaction to “bad facts.” Perhaps the best contemporary example is Michael Nifong, the prosecutor in the “Duke Rape Case.” Within hours after the “Duke Rape Case” story broke, vengeance was already in the air. Reporters spoke in dour tones about a racially motivated gang-rape over images of police-tape flapping in the breeze. Nifong, the local prosecutor, held daily press conferences in which he leaked new evidence and/or showed increasing outrage toward the accused. But, as the “bad facts” soon began to unravel, the “bad law” was revealed: Nifong had ignored and concealed critical evidence showing that the allegations were false, and he had done it in order to feed the public’s appetite for vengeance.

Imagine how it must have felt to be accused of such a horrific crime, knowing you were innocent. Imagine the police, the press, the prosecutor, and the public at large looking at you like a monster. Where do you turn in such a situation?

According to the Constitution, you turn to the courts. Especially when faced with “bad facts,” judges must remain the cold, clinical defenders of the Constitution -- the set of principles which require judges to treat every defendant as if he were wrongly accused. Judges must always force prosecutors to prove the State’s case beyond a reasonable doubt with reliable, admissible evidence. “Bad facts” enflame the public, make cops cut corners, and make prosecutors hide evidence. But, if our courts also succumb to the emotions aroused by “bad facts” and choose expediency over the rights of the wrongly accused, the Rule of Law has been lost.


The Toughest Witness of All: the Child-Accuser

Crimes involving child victims are a difficult subject to discuss. They occupy a special place in our hearts and minds. When we hear about an adult man being beaten or even killed, we are rarely upset. But when we hear of a child being hurt, especially at the hands of an adult, we all have a visceral reaction. And so it should be.

From a legal perspective, however, cases that involve child-accusers present unique challenges. For prosecutors, any case in which a child is the primary witness and source of evidence is extremely difficult to prove. This is especially so when the child is the accuser, and the crime is child abuse. The most notable dilemma for the prosecutor is whether to put the child-accuser on the witness stand. Obviously, prosecutors and family members do not want to re-traumatize the child by “forcing” the child to testify. But the big problem for prosecutors is that young children are, generally speaking, unreliable witnesses.

Although most young children are able to observe and report facts accurately, children at the center of abuse allegations are under immense pressure. It is unfortunately true that young children have been known to make things up, confuse real life with fantasy, or just get so caught up in a story and the attention that comes with it, that they feel they cannot go back and change it. It’s not that young children want to intentionally make false accusations against innocent people, or that they do so often. It’s just that a child’s mind can be a complicated place, and children do not always comprehend the gravity of misplaced accusations until it’s too late.

Because of the gravity of child abuse allegations and the relative unreliability of children as witnesses, accusations by children must always be closely examined. If the accused is guilty of the crime, the facts will bear that out. But, if a defendant is wrongly accused by a child, we must make sure to discover it, before we seek vengeance upon the accused. Thus, when deciding how a trial will be conducted and what evidence will be admitted, judges must always keep in mind the possibility that the defendant has been wrongly accused.

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July 10, 2008

Wrong-Way Driver Could Be Charged With DUI

A 36-year-old Allentown woman is facing drunken driving charges after she operated her vehicle against the flow of traffic on Route 22 in Bethlehem Township and struck a vehicle and injured a driver, the Express-Times reports. Michele L. Leigh crashed her Pontiac minivan into a Ford Mustang driven by Michael L. Rossetti III, 19, of Phillipsburg. According to police, Rossetti was injured and taken to an area hospital, but was listed in “fair” condition. Both of his passengers were not hurt in the crash.

Leigh, the driver facing a possible DUI charge, was not injured in the accident. Everyone was reportedly wearing their seatbelts. Police suspect that Leigh was driving under the influence, but have not charged her yet. Formal charges are pending an investigation and test results.

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July 3, 2008

Easton Man Faces Felony Driving Under the Influence Charge

A 26-year-old Easton man is facing charges of driving under the influence in connection with a Feb. 21 fatal auto accident in Ross Township. According to this report Dudd Flanagan III was driving a 2007 Hyundai west on Kunkletown Road in Ross Township when the accident happened.

Flanagan was passing a vehicle in front of him while approaching a curve when he lost control of his vehicle and slammed into a 1989 Ford Thunderbird driven by 53-year-old Jack Brodt of Saylorsburg. Brodt was pronounced dead at the scene. Flanagan was air-lifted to a local hospital but later released. Investigators reportedly found five unopened cans of Natural Ice beer on the passenger side floor and an unused syringe in his glove box. Officials say Flanagan’s blood drawn at the hospital, tested positive for various drugs including THC and opiates.

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